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This paper reviews the literature on the fiscal policy 
instruments commonly used to reduce transport sector 
externalities. The findings show that congestion charges 
would reduce vehicle traffic by 9 to 12 percent and 
significantly improve environmental quality. The vehicle 
tax literature suggests that every 1 percent increase in 
vehicle taxes would reduce vehicle miles by 0.22 to 0.45 
percent and CO2 emissions by 0.19 percent. The fuel tax 
is the most common fiscal policy instrument; however 
its primary objective is to raise government revenues 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to study climate change mitigation in the transport sector. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at gtimilsina@worldbank.org. 
rather than to reduce emissions and traffic congestion. 
Although subsidizing public transportation is a common 
practice, reducing emissions has not been the primary 
objective of such subsidies. Nevertheless, it is shown that 
transport sector emissions would be higher in the absence 
of both public transportation subsidies and fuel taxation. 
Subsidies are also the main policy tool for the promotion 
of clean fuels and vehicles. Although some studies are 
very critical of biofuel subsidies, the literature is mostly 
supportive of clean vehicle subsidies 
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Fiscal instruments are primarily price-based instruments that take advantage of market 
mechanisms and work through prices (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997). These instruments 
include: congestion charge or toll tax, emission and/or pollution tax or charge (e.g., 
carbon tax, sulfur tax), fuel tax (e.g., any excise tax on fuel or a BTU tax), vehicle tax 
(e.g., ownership, licensing or registration fee) and subsidies (e.g., subsidies for clean 
fuels, efficient vehicles, and public transportation). These instruments are expected to 
correct transport sector negative externalities through various means such as cutting 
travel demands, switching from private transportation to public transportation, 
substituting polluting fuels (e.g., petroleum products) with clean fuels (e.g., ethanol, 
hydrogen, compressed natural gas) and encouraging the public to use high-fuel economy 
vehicles.  
 
Despite well-established theoretical foundations and a few examples of 
implementation, fiscal policies are associated with several issues that require further 
investigation before they are recommended for broader implementation. The most 
important issue is which fiscal policy instrument would be the most effective and under 
what conditions? Are these policies mutually exclusive? If not, what combination of 
these instruments would produce the best results? Answering these questions is crucial as 
hundreds of cities throughout the globe, mostly in developing countries, are severely 
suffering from the negative transport sector externalities and are currently seeking 
appropriate instruments to correct them. With these issues in mind, our goal is to review 
the following potential fiscal policy instruments: congestion charge; fuel tax; emission 
tax; vehicle tax and subsides, while trying to bring their comparative advantages to light
1. 
 
                                                 
1 Note that there are other policy instruments, such as regulatory instruments (e.g., fuel economy standards, 
vehicle occupancy standards, high vehicle lanes), behavioral instruments (e.g., telecommuting, staggering 
work start times; promotion of multiple function trips) and infrastructure investment policies (e.g., bus 
rapid transit, metro etc.). This study focuses only on financial instruments for the sack of clarity and 
comparability of instruments considered. We leave reviews of other policy instruments for future studies. 
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Existing studies (e.g., Acutt and Dodgson, 1997), have reviewed alternative 
policy instruments used to reduce transport sector externalities. These studies however, 
focus only on their theoretical aspects and do not provide any quantitative information on 
the impacts of these policy instruments. To the contrary, our study discusses policy 
instruments that contain numerous examples of their actual implementation. The study 
first compares the different types of impacts the fiscal instruments have on vehicle 
mileage, congestion, emissions and welfare. Secondly, we compare fiscal policies that 
have been introduced throughout different parts of the world in terms of their ability to 
contain transport externalities, while providing some insight on how the same fiscal 
policy could produce different results in different geographical settings.  
 
We find that the selection of fiscal policy instruments depends on several factors 
such as: type of problem (e.g., congestion vs. emissions), severity of problem, flexibility 
to achieve the goals, and cost of the policy instruments. Mega-cities with predominantly 
private vehicles and with severe congestion problems may prefer congestion charges. On 
the other hand, developing cities looking for additional government revenue sources with 
no serious congestion or emission problems might consider fuel taxes. Subsidies created 
for public transportation are a common and conventional phenomenon in all countries 
throughout the world, even though these subsidies are not intended to reduce emissions or 
congestions. However, the level of transport sector externalities might have been higher 
in the absence of subsidies to public transportation. Moreover, subsidies have played key 
roles in promoting clean fuels (e.g., biofuels in the United States) and are expected to 
play similar roles in promoting clean vehicles.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses theory, real world 
examples, and impacts of congestion charge. Following is a brief review of fuel taxes 
including: fuel tax rates, revenue generation and environmental and economic impacts. 
Section 4 and 5 present, respectively, vehicle and emission taxes. In Section 6 we have an 
in-depth discussion of subsidies in public transportation, clean fuel and clean vehicles. 
Section 7 discusses parking charges. Section 8 highlights comparative pictures of the 





The main principle of congestion pricing is to impose higher charges on travelers at times 
and places when road systems are congested. This reduces both social and environmental 
costs imposed by congestion through enhancing traffic flow and decreasing travel 
demands and emissions resulting from the idling and slowing of vehicles. Thus, 
congestion charges internalize the additional travel cost imposed by motorists on fellow 
travelers by altering their travel behavior (Sikow-Magny, 2003). This charge also 
encourages people to travel during off-peak hours, through non-congested routes or 
through other modes of transportation. It is considered an effective policy instrument in 
controlling vehicular emissions because it helps to reduce the number and duration of 
trips, alter routes, and offers decreases in speed variation (Daniel and Bekka, 2000). 
However, the willingness of motorists to pay congestion charges depends upon their level 
of income and their availability of alternative means of transportation (Sharp, 1966). 
Congestion pricing is theoretically well-established and implemented in practice 




The theory of congestion pricing states that the charges imposed should equal the 
difference between the social marginal cost and the private cost for the flow, which will 
prevail only after imposing the charges (Jansson, 1969). Congestion charges are meant to 
internalize their external costs (Teubel, 1998). Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924) 
established a foundation to describe misallocation of resources resulting from free access 
to public roadways (see Figure 1). As illustrated in Figure 1, the average time taken for a 
motorist to travel a particular road segment increases with an increase in traffic flow. 
With the increased congestion, average speed decreases and average travel time increases 
for the driver. Thus, an increased travel time causes the average and the marginal travel 
costs to increase.  
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Source: Walters (1961) 
Figure 1.The Pigou-Knight Analysis 
 
Numerous studies (Vickery, 1969; Walters, 1961; Mohring and Harwitz, 1962; 
Kraus, 1981) persuaded Pigou to research the roles of taxation in an effort to internalize 
congestion externalities. Earlier studies (i.e., studies before nineties) focused mainly on 
reducing congestion (e.g., Walters 1961, Vickrey, 1963, Keeler and Small, 1977; 
Sullivan, 1983) whereas recent studies equally address both congestion and 
environmental pollution (Innes, 1995; Daniel and Bekka, 2000; Parry and Bento, 2002). 
These address the need and the effectiveness of taxation in correcting the misallocation of 




In order to reduce both the social and environmental costs associated with congestion, 
congestion charging systems have been adopted in various parts of the world with 
varying degree of success. Congestion charges that increase the cost of travel may 
convince motorists to alter their travel behavior, although some diversions of traffic may 
take place. The area licensing scheme (ALS), introduced by Singapore in 1975, is 
probably the first example of congestion pricing created to alter travel behavior. In this 
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system, only those cars with three or fewer people were charged. The charge ranged 
between $1.50 to $2.50 per day (Daniel and Bekka, 2000). In September 1998, after 23 
years in operation, the ALS was replaced by an electronic version called the Electronic Road 
Pricing System (ERP), (Keong, 2002). In 2003, the city of London introduced a congestion 
charging scheme in which vehicles entering inside a 22-square km zone comprising core 
shopping, government, entertainment and business districts were required to pay a 
congestion charge of £5 between 7 AM and 18.30 PM on weekdays. The change has been 
increased to £8 since July of 2005 (Schmöcker et. al., 2005).   
 
Table 1 presents congestion pricing schemes introduced in four countries: 
Singapore, Norway, the United States and the United Kingdom. Congestion charges are 
placed differently, by those who impose the schemes depending on the goals. In 
Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom, the primary objective behind road 
pricing is congestion relief, whereas in Norway, initially, it was designed to generate 
revenue (currently it is environmental quality and safety). In Singapore and the United 
Kingdom, motorists pay charges on a daily basis, unlike the United States and Norway 
where motorists pay a toll per passage. In Singapore, charges vary, depending on the 
peak and off-peak periods and are reviewed on quarterly basis (de Palma et. al., 2006)
2.  
                                                 
2 Note that the congestion charge and road pricing are used interchangeably in some literature. In this paper 
we have distinguished between the two and focus only on congestion charges, as the purpose of road 
pricing could be different from reducing traffic congestion (e.g., revenue generation etc.). We have not 
included road pricing literature in this paper. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Four Real-World Urban Road-Pricing Schemes 
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Inception year  1975                                  1986                             1995                             2003 
Objectives ALS  (1975–98):  congestion 
relief 
RPS (1995–98): familiarize 
users with link pricing; ERP 
(1998-):  
control congestion by 
maintaining 

















ALS: inbound cordon. Paid 
daily 
RPS: linear. Per passage 
ERP: CBD cordons and 
linear. Per passage. 
Inbound cordons. 
Per passage. 
Link. Per passage.  Area licensing 
scheme. Includes 
parking on public 
roads. Paid  
daily 
Tolled area or 
infrastructure 
ALS: 7 km2 restricted zone  Toll rings 
successively added 
in Bergen, Oslo, 
Namsos 
Trondheim etc. 
Five projects: SR-91 
and I-15 in 
California, I-10 and  
US 290 in Texas, I-
394 in Minneapolis-
St Paul 
21 km2 charge area 
around city centre. 
Means of 
payment 
ALS and RPS: paper licenses 
with manual enforcement 
ERP: in-Vehicle Units (IUs) 
and smart cards 
Electronic and 
manual 
Electronic Manual  payment 
by various means 
Time variation  ALS: morning peak, 
extended to evening in 1989 
and to inter-peak in 1994; 
RPS: morning peak; ERP: 
CBDs 7:30–10, 12–19; 
expressways: 7:30–9:30. 
Changes in 5 or 30-min. 
steps. Reviewed quarterly. 




















ERP: €3.75M  Trondheim: €23M 
(2002) 
SR-91: $21M (2004)  €130M 
Source: de Palma et. al., (2006). 
 
A congestion charge not only helps correct transport sector externalities, such as 
emissions and congestion, but also generates a significant amount of revenue. For 
example, annual revenues generated through congestion charges are much higher than the 





  In addition to alleviating traffic congestion, a congestion charge has several impacts, such 
as reducing fuel consumption, and improving environmental quality and social welfare. 




By definition, the primary objective of a congestion charge is to reduce traffic 
congestion. The congestion tax system introduced in London for example, led to the 
reduction in city-center traffic by 12%; of which 50-60% shifted to public transport 
(Transport for London, 2004). Rich and Nielsen (2007) estimate that annual reductions in 
car mileage in Copenhagen would be 7%, 6.5% and 3%, respectively, if congestion 
charges are introduced based on km charging, cordon and large toll ring systems. The 
reduction in congestion time would be approximately 2-3 times as high as that of car 
mileage. It is estimated that daily inbound traffic would be reduced by 5% in New York 
if a toll or a variable charge (like MTA) is introduced on the East River Bridge (Zupan et 
al., 2003). A London-type congestion charge would reduce daily traffic volume in the 
city by 9%; if a full variable pricing is introduced the reduction could reach 13% (Zupan 




A congestion charge reduces congestion, and as a result, reduces fuel consumption and 
associated emissions from vehicles which help improve environmental quality. Existing 
studies have assessed the environmental impacts of either proposed or actually 
implemented congestion charges. For example, Prud'homme and Bocarejo (2005) 
estimate the total environmental benefits generated by the congestion charge, introduced 
in London, at 4.9 million euros per year. The ex-post evaluation of the quantified impacts 
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of the congestion charging scheme in London, conducted by Evans (2007) show that 
distance vehicles traveled across London were reduced by approximately 211 million per 
year with a £5 charge, and 237 million with an £8 charge. The value of CO2 emissions 
saved was £2.3 million to £2.5 million with £5 and £8 charges. Rich and Nielson (2007) 
discuss the socio-economic assessment of proposed road user charging schemes in 
Copenhagen. They estimate that CO2 emissions in Copenhagen can be reduced anywhere 
from 11, 500 tons to 154,000,000 tons annually, depending upon the type of congestion 
charge (see Table 2).  They also find that the congestion charges, based on distance 
traveled (i.e., km charge) could reduce the highest amount of CO2 compared to other 
types of congestion charges, such as large toll ring, and small toll ring.  
 






charge  Large toll ring  Small toll ring 
Reduced CO2 tonnage (×1000)  154,000  138,000  58,000  11,500 
Reduced accidents (number)  330  155  298  100 
Reduced noise (1000 SBT)  2.7  2.7  1.2  0.2 
Reduced wear damage (million 
DKK) 12  11  4  1 
Source: Rich and Nielsen (2007) 
 
A congestion charge not only reduces traffic congestion, but also reduces carbon 
monoxide (CO) and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions proportionately more 
than other types of emissions (Abbott et al., 1995; Acutt and Dodgson, 1997). Daniel and 
Bekka (1999) estimate the impacts of congestion pricing on emissions of CO, nitrogen 
oxide and hydro carbons for an actual metropolitan highway network calibrating 
Delaware’s household travel demand, and highway traffic count data in EPA’s mobile 5a 
model. They find that vehicle emissions could be reduced as much as 10% in aggregate 





A large number of studies have analyzed the economic and welfare impacts of congestion 
charges (see e.g., Walters, 1961; Weitzman, 1974; Richardson, 1974; Arnott et. al., 1994; 
Parry and Bento, 2002; Santos and Rojey, 2004; Eliasson and Mattson, 2006). Whether 
or not a congestion charge improves welfare depends on several factors, including the 
definition of welfare itself. Studies conducted as early as the 1960s have showed that 
congestion charges can increase welfare (see e.g., Walters, 1961; Weitzman, 1974). This 
is because a congestion charge ensures a more efficient use of existing infrastructure 
while generating revenues, which then can be invested in the road and public transport 
system surplus (Eliasson and Mattson, 2006). However, the welfare of those who use the 
roadscan decline if the revenue generated from such charges is not returned to them 
(Glazer and Niskanen, 2000). Parry (2002) finds that, under ideal congestion pricing, a 
congestion tax imposed uniformly across freeway lanes can achieve more than 90% of 
the maximum efficiency gains.  
 
Existing studies such as Richardson (1974) and Arnott et al. (1994) argue that 
congestion charging could be regressive because it benefits higher income groups that the 
value time gained, and believe it worth the charge and thus, the people with small 
economic margins are worse off. As congestion charges disproportionately impact the 
travel choice of lower income households, revenue redistribution is the key to 
acceptability of congestion charging schemes. Evans (1992) argues that low-income 
groups can benefit from congestion charges if the revenue generated is invested in public 
transportation.  This is because low-income groups use public transportation more often 
than higher income groups, and thus will profit more from the revenues generated 
through congestion charging. There are several proposals (Goodwin, 1989; Small, 1992; 
Verhoef et. al., 1997) put forward to enhance acceptability of congestion-pricing 
schemes. Small (1992) proposes reimbursing the travelers as a group to offset the 
regressive taxes and using revenue to fund new transportation services. Verhoef et al. 
(1997) suggest considering the motorists’ preference while recycling revenues generated 
through congestion charges to the economy (e.g., investment in new roads, reduction of 
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fuel taxes). Different schemes for recycling congestion tax revenues obviously have 
different implications for different travelers. Eliasson and Mattson (2006), for example, 
show that women and low-income groups benefit the most when the revenue is used for 
improving public transport. The net benefit will be equal for men, and women on 
average, and benefit high income groups if revenues are used for tax cuts. The 
distribution impacts of congestion pricing depends upon where different population 
groups live and work, their mode of transportation for commuting, and the ways in which 
revenues collected are allocated (Santos and Rojey, 2004). Parry and Bento (1999) show 
that the net effect of a revenue-neutral tax on congestion can stimulate labor force 
participation at the margin.  De Borger and Mayeres, (2007) argue that the better welfare 
improvement is possible only when the government differentiates variable car taxes 
between periods to capture greater differences in congestion between peak and off-peak 
periods. De Palma et al. (2006) find that welfare gains tend to increase with an increase in 
proportion of a transport network that is priced. They argue that, in order to stop 
extensive traffic diversions in places where only a small fraction of transport network is 




A fuel tax is a levy on the consumption of fuel in proportion to its pre-tax price (Gupta 
and Mahler, 1994). Traditionally it is introduced for several purposes, such as to raise 
government revenue with low administrative costs; to conserve foreign exchange, and to 
generate revenue to finance road maintenance, etc. (Gupta and Mahler, 1994). Fuel tax 
can, however, act as a pricing instrument to correct transport sector externalities, such as 
congestion and environmental pollution (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997). In the short-run, a 
fuel tax results in an increase in fuel price, which in turn, discourages utilization of 
vehicles and thus over-consumption of fuel and release of emissions. In the long-run, fuel 
taxes also alter consumers’ purchasing behavior, thereby causing them to switch to more 
fuel-efficient methods (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997). Unlike other taxes, the fuel tax is 
administratively simple and well-established in principle. The fuel tax considers 





Table 3 compares fuel tax rates in Western Europe, Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries and selected developing countries. In 
OECD countries, tax rates vary from 50 cents per liter in Switzerland to $1.03 per liter in 
Portugal. These tax rates are 5 to 10 times higher than that in the United States, where the 
average fuel tax was 10 cents per liter in 2005. Although the fuel tax is one of the policy 
instruments, it is not necessary that it always provides desired results. How effective a 
fuel tax would be depends on price elasticity, the fuel use, and other factors such as other 
policy instruments superseding the fuel tax (Bonnel, 1995). For example, despite low fuel 
taxes, private vehicle use is relatively smaller in Switzerland as compared to other 
European cities. Bern and Zurich have a lower rate of private car use than Lyon, 
Grenoble, Montpellier in France, Cardiff and Liverpool in Great Britain, Oslo in Norway, 
and Bologna and Milan in Italy where the fuel tax is among one of the highest in Western 
European countries. Other policy instruments, particularly, private car control measures 
over the past 20 years, are mainly responsible for decreased car use in Bern and Zurich 
(Bonnel, 1995). 
 
It becomes evident from Table 3 that fuel tax rates in Western Europe are 
significantly higher than those in North America and other OECD countries. In most 
countries, fuel taxes provide more revenue than taxes on products such as tobacco and 
alcoholic beverages (Gupta and Mahler, 1994). In developing countries like Niger, 
Nicaragua, South Korea, and Côte d'Ivoire, fuel taxation accounts for more than 20% of 
total state revenue. The contribution of fuel tax toward governmental revenue is also 
fairly high in industrialized countries (See table 4). As in developing countries, fuel taxes 
in developed countries also account for substantial portions of state revenue. The fuel tax 
accounted for 10% of state revenue in the Netherlands, 12% percent in France, 17% 
percent in Spain, 17% in Japan, and 12% in the United States in  2004 (Metschies, 2005).  
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Table 3. Gasoline Taxes in Selected Countries in 2005  
Country Cents/liter  Country  Cents/liter 
Western Europe    Developing Countries 
Portugal   103 Kenya 47
Netherlands   100 Malawi 50
United Kingdom   97 Mali 71
Belgium   94 Mauritius 29
Italy   90 Morocco 65
Germany   90 Niger 57
France   89 Nicaragua 24
Finland   85 Pakistan 17
Sweden   80 Panama 09
Norway   74 Senegal 65
Spain   72 Sri Lanka  27
Denmark   70 Turkey 99
Austria   68 India 42
Ireland   62 Ghana 04
Luxembourg   60 China 03
Switzerland   50 Brazil 39
Other OECD Countries  Albania 78
Japan   46 Colombia 27
New Zealand   42 Costa Rica  33
Australia   35 Bolivia  09
Canada   26 Chile  40
Mexico   21
USA   10
a expressed in purchasing power parity at 2000 constant price. 




Table 4. Fuel Tax Revenues as Part of Total State Revenues 
Country Percentage  Country  Percentage 
Western Europe    Developing Countries 
Portugal   13 Kenya  9
Netherlands   10 Malawi  18
United Kingdom   14 Mali  10
Belgium   7 Mauritius  7
Italy   13 Morocco  11
Germany   8 Niger  20
France   12 Nicaragua  20
Finland   8 Pakistan  1
Sweden   6 Panama  2
Norway   8 Senegal  9
Spain   17 Turkey  18
Denmark   6 India  15
Austria   6 South Korea  33
Ireland   9 Brazil  5
Switzerland   7 Albania  24
Other OECD Countries  Côte d'Ivoire  20
Japan   17 Costa Rica  17
New Zealand   2 Eritrea  1
Australia   9 Chile  12
Canada   6
Mexico   1
USA   12





Although the fuel tax is introduced mainly to generate government revenues, it could 
have significant impact toward the reduction of emissions and traffic congestion. A 
number of existing studies (e.g., Eltony, 1993; Hirota et al., 2003; Sterner, 2006) 
demonstrate how the fuel tax reduces travel demand, fuel consumption, and emissions. 
Employing an econometric model for household gasoline demand in Canadian provinces 
for 1969-1988, Elton (1993) finds that a 10% increase in the fuel price would cause 75% 
of households to reduce their vehicle travel within one year after the fuel price increase.  
As a result, 15% of households shifted from large to small vehicles, and 10% of 
households switched from less fuel-efficient to more efficient vehicles. Using the data 
from 68 large cities worldwide, Hirota et al. (2003) demonstrate that for every 1% 
increase in the fuel tax, vehicle miles traveled (VMT) could be reduced by 0.042%. Fuel 
taxes have played an important role in restraining growth in transport sector fuel 
consumption and associated carbon emissions in OECD countries. Sterner (2006) 
calculates that had the different OECD countries introduced a gasoline tax at the level of 
EU countries, such as Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, gasoline 
consumption would have been reduced by 57% in the United States; 36% on average in 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand; 34% in Japan and 44% in the OECD as a whole. 
Since CO2 emissions are directly linked with fuel consumption, this would translate into a 
substantial reduction in CO2 emissions from the transport sector. Sterner also estimates 
that if all OECD countries had a low gasoline tax as does the United States, the total 
OECD gasoline consumption would have been 31% higher. These findings demonstrate 
the positive impacts of fuel taxes in fuel consumption and atmospheric emissions from 
the transport sector.  
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3.3. Fuel Tax Impacts on Welfare and Economy 
 
Economic intuition suggests that a fuel tax will cause welfare loss unless the 
environmental quality improved by the tax acknowledges welfare measures. Much of the 
burden (i.e., welfare cost) are found to be born by low-income households. Nelson et al. 
(2003), for example, find that motorists in the lowest quartile in the Greater Washington 
metro area pay $141 million per year in gasoline taxes, yet still suffer from a negative 
travel-related welfare change. They argue that welfare loss among the lowest income 
groups, is mainly because they value travel time improvements less than higher-income 
travelers and suffer from increased crowding on transit networks under a gas tax policy. 
Using the econometrically-based multi-market simulation model, Bento et al. (2005) 
demonstrate a considerable heterogeneity regarding the impacts of a gas tax on the 
poorest households. They find that the distributional impacts of a gas tax increase on the 
households with annual income less than $25,000 is higher than for those households with 
incomes greater than $75,000 in the United States. 
 
Some options exist designed to mitigate part, or even the whole losses of welfare 
caused by a fuel tax. Proost and Dander (2002), for example, show that if the revenue 
generated through gasoline taxes is recycled to cut labor taxes, it would improve the 
welfare effects. Parry and Bento (2002) find that the deadweight costs of the fuel taxes on 
labor force participation of those that are at the fringe can be reduced if the revenues 
collected through congestion taxes are used to reduce distortionary labor taxes.  
 
Existing literature illustrates that government spending of fuel tax revenues 
further worsens the economic inefficiency. For example, Wiese, et al. (1995) show that 
with an increase in the allocation of motor-fuel tax revenue for the general use by the 
government, the absolute and relative burden of the lowest income household also 
increases, and the policy becomes more regressive. 
 
Since an introduction of the fuel tax reduces welfare, a removal or a decrease of 
the fuel tax would alternately produce the opposite impact.  Uri and Boyd
 (1998) show, 
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for example, that a reduction of 4.3 cents/gallon in the excise tax on gasoline and diesel 
fuel would result in an increase in welfare by approximately $3.59 billion in the United 
States although such a cut would lead to a decrease of $2.37 billion in state revenue. 
 
There also exists some literature that finds fuel taxes progressive (Hughes, 1986, 
Casler and Rafiqui, 1993). Hughes (1986) shows that the net effects of taxes on 
petroleum are progressive in their distributional impacts and can be used to increase both
 
equity and allocative efficiency. Casler and Rafiqui (1993) argue that taxes on transport 
fuel are far less regressive than they are perceived to be. Toeing follows the same line, 





Depending upon the transportation policies adopted by countries or the local jurisdiction, 
a vehicle tax could be a non-recurrent payment in connection with its purchase and 
registration (e.g., turnover tax, registration tax, registration fees). Alternatively, it could 
be periodically charged to the vehicle as a tax on the ownership or tenure (e.g., vehicle 
tax, insurance tax) (Kunert and Kuhfeld, 2007). In addition to acquisition and ownership 
taxes, usage dependent taxes, fuel taxes, and value-added taxes are also imposed in many 
European and Asian countries. These taxes or charges may represent a significant burden 
on the acquisition and ownership of new vehicles by motorists. A vehicle tax can also be 
interpreted as a policy instrument designed to reduce emissions and congestion, 
discouraging use of private vehicles; moreover it could substitute private vehicles with 
public transportation services. 
 
Several factors are taken into consideration while creating vehicle taxes. 
Analyzing vehicle related charges and taxes in twenty-seven European countries, Kunert 
and Kuhfeld (2007) find that a broad range of factors are taken into consideration while 
imposing vehicle related taxes and charges in Europe. In Denmark, ownership tax is 
based on the fuel economy, whereas in Germany, it depends on emission standards. In 
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Sweden and the Netherlands, vehicle gross weight and fuel type are the criteria used to 
impose vehicle ownership tax. Vehicle ownership tax in France and the United Kingdom 
is based on CO2 emissions. In most European countries, vehicle ownership taxes depend 
on the engine model, the engine capacity, the fuel type, and the vehicle age or vehicle 
gross weight (Hirota et. al., 2003). In Asia, vehicle ownership tax includes road tax, the 
re-registration fee, and the rate often depends upon engine capacity. In Thailand and the 
Philippines, the vehicle ownership taxes are based on vehicle gross weight; while in 
Malaysia they are based on engine capacity (Hirota et. al., 2003).  
 
In some countries, such as Singapore, vehicle taxes have been used as the primary 
measure for discouraging private transportation and thereby reducing air pollution and 
congestion. Policies such as high vehicle ownership taxes, including the Additional 
Registration Fee (ARF), the Excise Duty and the annual Road Tax, and the Vehicle 
Quota System (VQS) have successfully contained congestion and other traffic externality 
problems in Singapore (Ang, 1996; Willoughby, 2000). These fiscal instruments 
significantly discouraged private vehicle ownership in the country during the 1970s and 
1980s (Barter, 2005). Since 1990, the VQS has also been applied to discourage private 
vehicle ownership
3. During 1990 - 2002, the VQS succeeded in bringing down the 
average annual motor vehicle population growth rate to 2.8% from 4.2% (Santos et. al., 
2004). Similarly, a strong growth in the vehicle fleet, especially private cars and 
motorcycles, was successfully curbed through a registration tax (FTR) and an annual 





                                                 
3 VQS system requires new vehicle owners first to secure a 10-year Certificate of Entitlement (CoE). It is to 
be purchased through an open auction out of a quota pre-established by the government.  The Quota 
Premium has risen steadily through 1994 and reached above US$27,000 equivalent for medium-sized 
cars and above US$45,000 for larger cars (Willoughby, 2001). 
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Car-related taxes play an important role in reducing over all VMT and CO2 emissions. 
Hirota et al., (2003) using data from 68 large cities, 49 OECD countries and 19 non-
OECD countries in Asia show that for every 1% increase in ownership tax, VMT 
decreases by 0.22% and for every 1% increase in acquisition tax, VMT decreases by 
0.45%.  However, for a 1% increase in acquisition and ownership taxes, CO2 emissions 
decreased by 0.19% and 0.19% respectively. Although higher acquisition and ownership 
taxes discourage vehicle ownership, it might not if the acquisition and ownership taxes of 
used vehicles remain low. People may respond to higher taxes and fees by buying older,
 
 ( ritchard and DeBoer, 1995).   less fuel efficient models P
5. Emission Taxes4 
 
An emission tax refers to a levy charged directly on effluents, or on a fuel in proportion 
to contents of emission causing elements of the fuel. For example, a NOx (Oxides of 
Nitrogen) tax is charged based on the amount of NOx released from a vehicle. A carbon 
tax, on the other hand, is levied for fuels in proportion to their carbon contents. Similarly, 
a sulfur tax is also levied for fuels based on their sulfur contents. In general, if the content 
of a fuel (e.g., carbon, sulfur) is primarily responsible for the emissions, the tax is based 
in proportion to that content. On the other hand, if the source of emissions is not only the 
content of the fuel, but also other factors, the emission charge is then directly applied to 
the emissions. For example, NOx is released not only due to the oxidation of nitrogen 
present in a fuel (i.e., fuel NOx), but also in the atmospheric nitrogen (i.e., thermal NOx).  
 
  Three types of emission taxes are normally found either proposed or introduced in 
order to reduce transport sector emissions. These are: (i) taxes on local air pollutants such 
as suspended particulate matters (SPM), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), (ii) taxes 
                                                 
4 Literature on emission taxes to reduce transport sector externalities is limited. There are two reasons 
behind this. First, in contrast to a stationary source, monitoring of emissions is expensive for mobile 
sources and hence the emission tax might not be the preferable instrument to reduce transport 
externalities. Secondly, emission taxes when applied to a fuel (e.g., carbon or sulfur taxes) might be 
interpreted as fuel taxes and included in the fuel tax category.  
 
 20 
on local, as well as regional air pollutants, such as NOx, SOx (e.g., sulfur tax) and (iii) 
taxes on GHG emissions (e.g., carbon tax). The first types of taxes are not common. The 
second types of taxes are found introduced in a number of cities, such as Tokyo. 
Moreover, a reduction in the sulphur content of fuel is important not only to reduce SO2 
emissions, but also to improve the effectiveness of catalysts used to reduce NOx 
(Sheffield et. al., 2001). Mobile sources are subject to the sulphur emissions charges in 
Japan. The Japanese government has levied sulphur emissions charges to compensate 
victims of SO2 pollution-related diseases.  
 
The carbon tax is the most widely discussed policy instrument in literature due to 
overwhelming interest by researchers on climate change. A carbon tax can be introduced 
uniformly to all types of energy consumers (e.g., households, industry, government etc.) 
and hence literature on carbon tax that is focuses specifically on the transport sector 
emissions is not common. Some studies (e.g., Timilsina & Shrestha, 2002) which provide 
information on the sectoral impacts of a carbon tax could shed light on its impacts on 
transport sector emissions. One should, however, be cautious while interpreting these 
results because the transport sector in most CGE models does not account for private 
transportation but for the household sector. Speck (1999) finds impacts of the carbon tax 
to be moderate based on the type of fuel (transport or heating) that is being taxed. Barker 
and Köhler (1998) argue that the taxation of transport fuels possesses, although weak, a 
progressive outcome for most European Union countries. They suggest that the overall 




A subsidy is a traditionally-used, and probably the most common, fiscal instrument in the 
transport sector, particularly in developing countries. A subsidy can be provided to public 
transportation (e.g., bus, railway and water transportation), clean fuels (e.g., ethanol, bio-
diesel) and clean vehicles (e.g., fuel cell and hydrogen cars, CNG bus, etc.). 
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While subsidies for public transportation could reduce both emissions and 
congestion, subsidies for cleaner fuels and vehicles do not necessarily help reduce neither 
congestion nor the number of cars on the roads. However, clean fuel and vehicle 
subsidies can help reduce emissions in the transport sector.  
6.1 Subsidies on Public Transportation 
 
Switching to public transportation (e.g., rail, bus) from private transportation (e.g., car) is 
considered an effective policy instrument designed to reduce transport sector 
externalities, mainly congestion and emissions problems. Subsidies on public 
transportation could be the main fiscal instrument that triggers a change from one mode 
of transportation to another.  
 
Public transportation has already been subsidized in many countries around the 
world for several reasons. For example, only 25% of the total capital and operating 
expenses in the United States and 50% in Europe are covered by fares for public transit 
(Brueckner, 1987). In developing countries, public transport subsidies are necessary 
mainly because drivers, in low-income households, can neither afford to own private 
vehicles, nor pay the actual fare if public transportation is not subsidized (Cropper and 
Bhattacharya, 2007). Public transportation subsidies can thus be interpreted as 
environmental policy instruments from two angles. First, existing subsidies could have 
contributed to both reducing emissions and congestion because some users  of public 
transportation could have used private transportation and thus increased emissions or 
worsened congestion in the absence of such subsidies. For example, Cropper and 
Bhattacharya (2007) find that removal of the bus subsidy (i.e., a 30% increase in fares) 
would reduce bus commuters by 10-11% in Mumbai, India. Second, additional subsidies 
on purely environmental grounds could help reduce emissions and congestion by 
encouraging travelers to switch to public transportation from private transportation. Note 
that an increase in public transport subsidies would reduce fares of public transportation 
thereby increasing ridership (De Witte et. al., 2006). With increases in public transport 
ridership, there will be fewer cars on the roadways, which will result in the reduction in 
total atmospheric emissions from the transport sector (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997).  
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Subsidies in public transportation could have both short- and long-term effects. In 
the short-term these subsidies will help reduce the use of private vehicles as well as 
congestion and emissions. Whereas in the long-term, they could reduce ownership of 
private vehicles and further reduce the externalities. Based on evidence regarding the 
relationship between public transport generalized costs and car ownership, Goodwin 
(1992) argues that increased public transport subsidies coupled with better service quality 
will certainly result in the reduction of car ownership and increase the public transport 
demand . 
 
6.2 Subsidies on Clean Fuel 
 
Subsidies are key fiscal policy instruments designed to promote clean fuel, particularly 
the use of biofuels. Subsidies on biofuels are common practice in countries where their 
production is significant (e.g., Brazil, United States, and Germany). In India, sugar mills 
interested in setting up ethanol production facilities, receive subsidized loans for 40% of 
project costs from the government. Ethanol subsidies are directed towards consumers in 
Brazil. Sales taxes are lower for hydrous ethanol (containing water) and E25 (25 percent 
ethanol) than gasoline (Coyle, 2007). In the European Union, twenty one countries grant 
a tax exemption (full or partial) for each liter of biodiesel supplied on the market, 
whereas twenty countries grant tax exemptions on bioethanol (Kutas et. al., 2007). 
Biofuel subsidies are often justified on the basis of their alleged positive effects on 
climate, energy, and agricultural policy goals (Henke et. al., 2005). 
 
There has been a tremendous growth in the Ethanol market in the United States in 
the past two decades from 550 millions gallon in 1984 (Rask, 1998) to 3,600 million 
gallons in 2004 (Shapouri and Gallagher, 2005). Along with increases in production, the 
number of ethanol producing plants has also increased. They increased from fewer than 
20 in 1980 to more than 80 in 2004 (Shapouri and Gallagher, 2005). However, unlike in 
Brazil, where ethanol accounts for about 30% of gasoline demand, its share is only 2% of 
the total transport fuel demand in the United States (Fulton, et. al., 2004). 
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  There are several major subsidies and incentives introduced by federal and state 
governments in the United States. The federal incentives include: Biodiesel Blenders tax 
credit, smaller producer tax credits Federal Bio-based products preferred procurement 
program, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Energy Systems and Energy 
Efficiency Improvements Program, and the USDA Value-Added Producer Grant 
Program. It is argued that without the existing federal and state subsidies, which average 
about $0.8 per gallon, ethanol production in the United States would not be economically 
viable (Saitone et al., 2007). The total cost of ethanol subsidized both by the federal and 
the state government was estimated to be $5.1 billion in 2006.  
 
  With changes in market conditions, the institutional structure surrounding ethanol 
has also changed substantially. Following Schumacher (2006), Tables 5(a) and 5(b) 
highlight the federal and state-level subsidies and other incentives for transportation of 
clean fuel in the United States. 
 
Table 5: Federal and State Level Subsidies on Clean Fuels in the United States 
Table 5(a): Federal Level Subsidies 
 
Subsidy   Description 
Biodiesel Blender Tax Credit  Producers receive a tax credit of $1.00 per gallon of biodiesel 
produced from virgin oil, which could be either animal fats or 
oilseeds. 
Smaller Producer Tax Credit  Producers with less than 60 million gallons of biodiesel or 
ethanol per annum can receive a tax credit of $0.10 per gallon 
for the first 15 million gallons of production, with a maximum 
tax credit being $1.5 million per year. 
Alternative Fuel Infrastructure 
Tax credit 
Tax credit is equal to 30% of the cost of alternative refueling 
property, maximum amount being $30,000 for businesses and 
$1000 for individuals using alterative fuels such as Biodiesel 
blends of B20 or more and ethanol blends of E85 or greater 
USDA Renewal Energy 
Systems and Energy 
Efficiency Improvement 
Programs 
Projects generating energy from renewal sources (including 
biodiesel and ethanol) can get grants of up to $500,000 and loan 
guarantees of up to $10,000,000. However, grant requests are 
limited to 25% and loan guarantees are limited to 50% of the 
total project costs. 
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Table 5 (b): State Level Subsidies 
 
Subsidy   Description 
Montana 
Biodiesel Production 
Facility Tax Credit 
Tax credit equal to 15% of the cost to compensate for depreciation of 
equipments in the construction and facilities to be used for the 
production of biodiesel  
Biodiesel Production 
Incentive 
Producers receive $0.10 for each gallon of biodiesel produced that 
represents an increase over the previous year’s production. However, 
this incentive is available only for the first three years of a production 
facility’s operation and is scheduled to expire on July 1, 2010 
Refund for taxes paid 
on biodiesel by a 
distributor or retailer 
A refund of $0.02 per gallon is paid to the distributor and $0.01 to the 
retailer for the previous quarter, if biodiesel was produced entirely from 
ingredients produced in the state of Montana  
Alternative Fuel 
Conversion Tax Credit 
50% of the cost (up to $500) of converting vehicle that runs on fuel 





Tax deduction for distributors of biodiesel produced from oilseeds or 
animal fats. However, It is provided in the form of a reduced tax rate, 
$0.225 per gallon as opposed to $0.25 per gallon for petroleum and 




A $0.40 per gallon credit for ethanol producers if 25% of their feedstock 
purchases are produced in Wyoming. However, there is a ceiling of $2 
million per year for individual producers 
North Dakota 
Biodiesel Tax Credit  A biodiesel tax credit of 10% per year up to five years for costs incurred 
to develop or modify a facility to produce or blend biodiesel. However, 
the amount received as a tax credit cannot exceed $50,000 per year and a 
cumulative maximum of $250, 000 
Ethanol production 
incentive programs 
Facilities that produce fewer than 15 million gallons receive a maximum 
of $900,000. The incentive, however, decreases once the facility exceeds 
the ceiling of 15 million gallons. After 15 million gallons, they qualify 




Up to $325,000 for eligible facilities that convert or build infrastructure 
required to distribute E85 fuel. Retailers can claim an ethanol tax credit 
of $0.025 per gallon for every gallon of ethanol blended fuel that they 
sell in excess of 60% of their total volume 
Illinois 
Clean school bus 
program 
Rebates of up to 80% or maximum $4000 towards the purchase of 
alternative fuel vehicles. Sales or use tax exemption on biodiesel blends 




A $0.20 per gallon incentive to ethanol producers; however, a producer 




Some environmentalists and economists argue against the ethanol subsidy, citing 
its dire effects for both the economy and the environment (Stiglitz, 1998). Pimentel 
(2003) argues that subsidized ethanol production is not only environmentally deleterious, 
but also ethically questionable because corn production causes more total soil erosion 
than any other crop and also increases environmental degradation. Pimentel further 
argues that diverting human food resources to the costly inefficient production of fuel 
raises an ethical question as more than half of the world's population is malnourished.   
 
6.3 Subsidies on Clean Vehicles 
 
Subsidies or some form of financial incentives are necessary to encourage automobile 
buyers to purchase low carbon-emitting vehicles such as hybrid cars. In many countries, 
electric vehicles and vehicles fueled by alternate fuels are subsidized by the government. 
For example, Chinese cities such as Beijing, Shanghai Tianjin, Shenzhen, Xi’an, 
Chongqing and Changchun have begun a program called ‘National Clean Vehicle 
Action’ since 1999 to combat vehicular pollution and also to reduce oil dependency. This 
program was introduced to encourage the use of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) and 
Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) in transport. Local governments provide financial support to 
this program. In 1998, the Shanghai Municipal Government provided 9 million Yuan and 
exempted import duty on equipment to build LPG stations (Zhao, 2006).  
 
Subsidies can facilitate market penetration of High Efficiency Vehicles (HEV) 
such as hybrids. According to Maclean and Lave (2003), a hybrid vehicle needs to be 
driven for 14 years or 313,000 kilometers before customers begin to enjoy true financial 
benefits. In the United States and Japan, the governments offer consumer tax deductions 
for the purchase or conversion of an approved clean fuel vehicle. The federal government 
in the United States offers consumers tax deductions ranging from $2,000 to $50,000 
towards incremental expenditure increases for the purchase or conversion of an approved 
clean fuel vehicle (Perkins, 1998). In Japan, a separate reduction in the acquisition tax for 
vehicles that meet certain emission targets exists (Hirota et. al., 2003). Like the United 
States and Japan, Malaysia also provides financial incentives to encourage the use of 
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clean fuel vehicles. The Malaysian government provides public service vehicles in urban 
areas using natural gas to ease the strain of road taxes: monogas vehicles receive a 50% 
discount and bi-fuel or dual fuel vehicles receive a 25% discount (Hirota et. al., 2003). In 
Finland, sales tax is lower for low-emission vehicles. In the Netherlands, although the car 
purchase tax is 45.2%, there are fixed allowances of 1,540 euros for LPG cars (Potter and 
Parkhurst, 2005). 
 
There exists a consensus among existing studies that subsidies are necessary to 
promote clean vehicles. Rubin and Leiby (2002) argue that, without subsidies, no 
substantial hybrid penetration is possible; they estimate that a permanent subsidy of 
$1600 per vehicle would ensure a market share of hybrid vehicles at about 45%, while a 
$4000 subsidy could increase the share to 90% in the United States. Using the MARKAL 
model, Ichinohe and Endo (2006) show that the share of hybrid passenger cars in 2030 
could be 62% and the peak total subsidy required to achieve that share would be $1.23 
billion per year in 2020 to reduce energy related annual CO2 emissions 8% below the 
1990 level through 2030 in Japan. Based on a survey conducted to study the rebound and 
other possible affects of tax rebates among 367 buyers of the hybrid second-generation 
Toyota Prius car in Switzerland in the first 9 months after the market entry, Haan et. al. 
(2007) finds that the tax rebates incentives could lead to significant increases in sales in 
Swiss cantons having tax rebates. Similarly, Potoglou and Kanaroglou (2007), using the 
Nested Logit (NMNL) model, find that the reduced monetary costs, purchase tax reliefs 
and low emission rates are the factors that would encourage households to buy cleaner 
vehicles within the metropolitan area of Hamilton, Canada. Carlsson and Johansson-
Stenman (2002) show that battery-powered cars cannot compete with conventional 
gasoline powered cars in the Swedish transport sector unless an unanticipated major 
breakthrough in battery technology occurs, thereby implying for a subsidy for electric 
vehicles. According to Funk and Rabl (1999), as the social cost of the Electric Vehicle 
(EV) is at least 50% more than that of gasoline-powered cars, the cost of air pollution 
associated with cars using gasoline alone is not enough to give the EV a clear advantage 





Parking charges can also be interpreted as an instrument to reduce transport sector 
externalities as it could discourage driving through increasing the costs of car use. 
Moreover, in areas where parking charges are levied, it could lead to an increase in the 
use of public transportation (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997). Feeney (1989) shows that an 
increased parking cost and decreased availability may have five major effects on 
motorists: (1) change their parking location, (2) change starting time of their journey, (3) 
change the mode used, (4) change trip destination and (5) abandon the trip altogether. 
Willson and Shoup (1990) estimate that an increase in parking charges for all employees 
in government offices in Ottawa, Canada not only led to a 20% reduction in single car 
trips, but also forced a model shift. Through simulation studies of five British cities, 
Dasgupta et al. (1994) demonstrate that doubling the parking charges reduces car share of 






As there is no single policy that fits all prescriptions when it comes to designing 
appropriate fiscal instruments to combat transport sector externalities, many cities around 
the world, particularly in developing countries, are experiencing difficulty in trying to 
determine appropriate sets of policy instruments to reduce the transport sector 
externalities. Existing literature (e.g., Molina and Molina, 2004) suggests that urban air 
pollution originating from transport activities cannot be solved through one specific 
strategy; instead, it requires a mix of policy measures that best suit each city’s specific 
circumstances. For example, as marginal decisions to travel are directly affected by a set 
of taxes and charges such as fuel taxes, road pricing, and other road usage related 
charges, imposition of fuel taxes alone may only account for some externalities but not 
all. Although fuel taxes, to some extent, can be justified as road use charges, they are 
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relatively blunt instruments and may not account for marginal congestion costs. In 
congested urban conditions, fuel consumption per km increases as a result of which 
marginal congestion costs can exceed fuel taxes by a factor of 20 or more (Newbery, 
2001). Imposing vehicle ownership taxes may discourage car ownership, but not its use 
by motorists. In order to discourage both car ownership and usage, it may be necessary to 
implement car ownership taxes and other vehicle use related charges concurrently (Faiz 
et.al. 1990). Thus, a well-designed tax on vehicle ownership and use and on fuel 





Some governments favor policy instruments which fulfill multiple objectives. For 
example, the New Zealand government favors a combination of energy taxes, fuel taxes 
and carbon taxes (Scrimgeour, et. al., 2005). However, some argue that fiscal policy 
instruments that directly address externalities would be the most efficient ones, for 
example, congestion tax or charge to reduce congestion or emission tax to reduce 
emissions. An energy tax could encourage energy conservation, reduce emissions and 
increase government revenues; however, an energy tax is always more costly than the 
emission tax if the primary objective of the tax is to reduce emissions (e.g., Goulder, 
1995; Timilsina and Shrestha, 2007). This is because an energy tax is an indirect 
instrument and an emission tax is a direct instrument designed to reduce emissions. 
 
Selection of fiscal instruments to reduce transport sector externalities within cities 
depends upon the specific situation of the city. Kingham et al. (1999), for example, 
cautioned  the use of fuel taxes alone to reduce transport. They argue that, although fuel 
taxes could be effective in terms of smoothing traffic flows, reducing  congestion and 
emissions, an increasing  fuel prices, they will have limited impact if not accompanied by 
alternative modes of incentives. More specifically, in a city where a public transport 
system is weak, a fuel tax does not necessarily result in switching to public transportation 
from private transportation. Hence, a fiscal policy instrument which works in one country 
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may not necessarily work in others with a different socioeconomic and cultural context. 
For example, policy instruments, like Area Licensing Scheme (ALS) which was viewed 
as very successful in Singapore, might not work in countries like India or Indonesia. 
Although this policy is easy to comprehend and relatively cheaper to enforce in 
developed countries like Singapore and the United States, it might be expensive because 
of socio-economic and political settings in developing countries (Chin, 1996). In low-
income countries with low administrative capacities, an instrument with smaller or no 
monitoring costs (e.g., fuel tax, emission tax) would be more effective than those 
requiring large monitoring or administrative and compliance costs (Gwilliam and Shalizi, 
1996). 
 
Some existing studies, such as Michaelis and Davidson (1996), Acutt and 
Dodgson (1997), Sterner (2006) argue that fuel taxes tend to be the most effective ones 
when it comes to reducing CO2 emissions. This is true only when the fuel tax is designed 
in proportion to the carbon contents of the fuel used. If the fuel tax is designed based on 
its heat content or refinery gate price, it would not be effective to reduce emissions; 
instead, it would be effective to generate revenues. Newbery (2001) suggests that fiscal 
taxes on road transport fuels are the most important energy taxes that can be justified as a 




Fiscal policy instruments are normally compared based on their overall economic or 
welfare effects. However, there is no consensus in the literature on the basis at which the 
instruments are compared. What should be the basis for the comparison of policy 
instruments: efficiency or equity? Or any other criteria such as implementation, 
administration and compliance costs? Using the model of a discrete choice of vehicle 
bundle and the continuous choice of vehicle-miles-traveled, West (2004), demonstrates 
that taxes on vehicle engine size, which is the basis for vehicle ownership taxes in many 
countries, or subsidies to new vehicles are significantly more regressive than gas or 
mileage taxes. This implies the use of efficiency as a yardstick for comparing the 
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instruments. On the other hand, Aasness and Larsen (2003) argue that some 
environmental taxes levied on specific consumer goods lead to a more equal distribution 
than others. They state that a differentiated, empirically-based tax system may attain both 
environmental targets and distributional goals. Following the equity argument, lower 
taxes on bus rides, bicycles, and mopeds, whereas higher taxes on air flights, taxis, and 
automobiles have positive environmental effects as well as inequality reduction potential.  
 
Taxes (e.g., congestion changes, emission taxes) have a greater potential to reduce 
emissions and congestion, however, one of the major challenges facing implementation 
of these instruments is how to ensure that transportation costs to low-income travelers are 
not disproportionately high. Faiz et al. (1990) suggests that it is not easy to establish 
economically-justified and socially-acceptable motor vehicle control measures in 
developing countries because the magnitude of the problem and its consequences are not 
yet well understood. According to the equity principle, in developing countries where low 
income households cannot afford private vehicles, the wealthy should bear a relatively 
larger share of the tax burden than the poor. On the contrary, in high-income countries, 
where fuel use for road transportation is not a luxury good, ability to pay the principle 
does not hold true (Rietveld and Van Woudenberg, 2005). Jacobsen et al. (2003) find that 
higher taxes on private transport (registration duty and petrol tax) would be one way to 





As the severity of the impact of air pollution increases, assimilative capacity of the 
environment, public attitudes, and degree of urbanization, transportation systems, and 
economic conditions, developing countries are confronted with the daunting task of 
answering a very basic question: What strategies should be adopted, how soon, and at 
what cost? (Faiz et.al.1990). Although developing cities have taken steps towards vehicle 
use restrictions, new technologies, privatization, transit management, transit service 
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innovation, and transportation pricing, very few, however, have taken concrete steps 
towards actually solving the problem (Gakenheimer, 1999). 
 
Existing literature (e.g., Kathuria, 2002a) points out that it is extremely important 
to discourage ownership of private vehicles in developing countries. With rapid 
population growth, growth in disposable income, and out-migration of rural population, 
the cities in developing worlds are going to witness rapid surges in urban transportation 
demands. Between 370 and 600 new vehicles are being registered every day in Delhi, 
India.  In an advent of such a rise in the number of vehicles, improvement in air quality is 
an illusive dream (Kathuria, 2002a).  
 
As many large cities in the developing world are the centers of education, 
research, and innovation, the decline in mobility significantly damages the roles that they 
play. Thirty-five percent of Bangkok’s gross city product is lost in congestion 
(Gakenheimer, 1999). He argues that countries in the developing world need to resort to 
assertive policies of congestion pricing and various kinds of ownership/use charges. In 
Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, area licensing schemes resembling Singapore's have been 
repeatedly proposed. Although assertive policies of pricing have not appeared on a long-
term basis in the lower income countries, with the passage of time and growth of the 
congestion problem, it may become a real possibility. 
 
According to Eskeland and Jimenez (1992), price-based instruments are superior 
and provide greater certainty in reducing transport sector externalities. In developing 
countries, where the buses and taxis account for the greater percentage of public 
transportation, market-based solutions such as fiscal incentives can prompt car owners to 
convert their vehicles to run on alternative fuels such as LPG, CNG, or alcohol. Faiz etal. 
(1990) argues that higher taxes and license fees on the use of old, polluting vehicles can 
discourage the ownership of polluting vehicle fuels. Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) 
recommend the fuel tax because of the low enforcement costs and because user fraud is 
difficult to accomplish. However, even though the fuel tax is administratively simple to 
implement and targets most important emissions effectively, it is not sufficient enough to 
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base the entire policy framework for emission reductions (Johnstone and Karousakis, 
1999). 
 
There is a rapid growth in the number of motor vehicles in much of the 
developing world.  In most countries, the growth is taking place at more than 10% a year 
and the doubles within 7 years (Gakenheimer, 1999). Thus, relying on single instruments, 
specifically command and control instruments (CAC), may be insufficient in controlling 
emissions from transport sectors in developing countries. Using the ambient air pollution 
data collected from the busiest intersection in Delhi, India, Kathuria (2002a) empirically 
demonstrates that CAC measures have not led to concomitant improvement in ambient 
air quality in the city. 
 
Eskeland and Jimenez (1992) argue that, although there are no rigorous studies of 
pollution control in developing countries, there exists convincing casual evidence that 
regulations to protect the environment are ineffective or unnecessarily costly. The 
developing countries that have heavily relied on regulatory measures, containing 
vehicular emission through CAC instruments might be an uphill task. With the rapid 
increase in the number of vehicles, unless the enforcement standards are made more 
stringent, a regulatory approach based on emissions standards alone is bound to result in 
greater pollution (Kathuria, 2001b).  
 
As there is no certainty about where the growth of motorization in developing 
countries will attenuate, its rapid growth shall continue for years to come. In order to 
avoid high economic and social impacts costs, Gakenheimer, (1999) suggest that actions 
to confront costs must be high yield ones. Faiz et al. (1990) argue that the promising way 
to control the increase in vehicle emissions within developing countries is through traffic 
management, and with administratively simple policy measures. It is not very difficult to 





This study presents a review of various types of fiscal policy instruments used to reduce 
transport sector externalities, particularly traffic congestion and atmospheric emissions.  
Four tax instruments: congestion charge, fuel tax, vehicle tax, and emission tax and three 
subsidy policies: subsidies on public transport, clean fuels and clean vehicles are 
discussed in terms of their theoretical basis and examples of their introduction in practice. 
Their impacts, particularly, on transport demand, vehicular pollution and economics and 
welfare are reviewed.  
 
Our study finds that, although there is rich literature on policy instruments written 
to reduce transport sector externalities, implementation of these policies are limited to a 
few cities, such as Singapore, London, New York and Stockholm. Research on the 
congestion charge began in the early half of the 20
th century with the pioneering works of 
Arthur Pigou, but it was not introduced in practice until the mid seventies in Singapore. 
Congestion charges seem to produce desired impacts in reducing vehicle mileages and 
also reducing vehicle emissions, to some extent. However, whether or not a congestion 
charge improves welfare is still debatable as some studies find welfare improving, 
whereas others find the opposite.  It tends to depend on various factors such as the of 
networks charged, revenue neutrality of the tax, population groups that are being charged 
for using networks, the mode of transportation used for commuting, and the ways in 
which revenues collected are ultimately allocated. Besides the congestion charge, vehicle 
taxes are seen as playing a successful role in containing private vehicles in some cities, 
such as Singapore and Hong Kong.  
 
Fuel taxes are not found to have been introduced to reduce transport sector 
externalities, instead they have been primarily aimed at raising government revenues. It is 
estimated that fuel taxes contribute as much as 20% of total government revenues in 
some countries, such as, Niger, Nicaragua, South Korea and Côte d'Ivoire. Still, fuel 
taxes are interpreted as policy instruments used to reduce transport sector externalities 
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because the level of the externalities would be higher than in the scenario without such 
taxes.  
 
The emission tax is an area where literature has rapidly grown over the past 25 
years, however, the focus is mainly on carbon tax due to overwhelming interests by 
researchers on climate change. Besides the carbon tax, sulfur tax and NOx tax are also 
proposed, however, emission taxes are rarely used to reduce transport sector emissions 
because of monitoring costs.  
 
Three types of subsidies are discussed in the literature and are also introduced in 
practice: subsidies for public transportation, clean fuel and vehicles. Subsidies on public 
transportation are traditional practices both in developed and developing countries. Public 
transportation subsidies are not originally intended to reduce emissions. They are actually 
meant to cover operating costs of public transportation. Nevertheless, public 
transportation subsidies can be interpreted as instruments to reduce the transport sector 
externalities as the level of externalities would be higher in the absence such subsidies. 
Subsidies have been used as primary incentives to promote clean fuels, particularly 
biofuels. Biofuels subsidies are provided either producers (e.g., ethanol producers in the 
United States) or consumers (e.g., Brazil). However, it is not clear what type of subsidy 
(producer or consumer or mixed) would be the most effective. Moreover, some studies 
criticize that biofuel subsidies, particularly in the developed countries, are not 
environmentally and ethically justifiable. Subsidies for cleaner vehicles (e.g., electric 
vehicles, hybrid vehicles, CNG buses) are becoming popular in many countries, such as 
China, India, the United States and Japan. Unlike subsidies for biofuels, no existing 
studies are arguing against clean vehicle subsidies. 
 
Existing literature also highlights a number of factors to be considered while 
designing fiscal policy instruments to reduce transport sector externalities, particularly if 
fiscal policy instruments already introduced in industrialized countries can be replicated 
in developing countries. These factors include, among others, efficiency, equity, existing 
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